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Bethlen’s 1922 campaign, especially its treatment of foreign policy questions, has not been inves-
tigated by the relevant literature so far, although it is fairly well-known that the Prime Minister, 
Count István Bethlen, participated in the international conference in Genoa between 8 and 21 
April 1922. He returned from there on account of the need to administer the election campaign 
in Hungary. Convinced by the results of the Genoa Conference, he gave a realistic foreign policy 
programme: this fitted into the expectations of the winners, but at the same time, made a stand 
for the country’s independence and full sovereignty. The programme refused the intervention of 
the Little Entente into the internal affairs of Hungary, but urged to enter into trade treaties with 
them. What is more, it also made a stand for the interests of the Hungarians living as a minority. 
All these considerations show that Bethlen urged and supported consolidation in Hungarian 
foreign policy, too. It was also a contribution to the 1922 election campaign of the Unity Party, 
and last but not least, to the development of the new foreign policy orientation of the Hungarian 
state. 
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Bethlen’s 1922 campaign, especially its treatment of foreign policy questions, 
has not been investigated by the relevant literature so far,1 although it is fairly 
well-known that the Prime Minister, Count István Bethlen, participated in the 
international conference in Genoa between 8 and 21 April 1922. He returned 
from there on account of the need to administer the election campaign in Hun-
gary. This study does not attempt to investigate and analyse the negotiations of 
the delegation of the Hungarian government at the Genoa Conference. The 
analysis of the pieces of press information on the conference is not attempted 
here either. In general, it can be claimed that liberal newspapers, for example, 
the Világ, criticised the work of the Hungarian delegation and found the 
achievements lacking. In contrast, the pro-government press, including the 
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Szózat, praised the achievements of the delegation and Bethlen’s diplomatic 
ingeniousness in particular. 
On 23 April Bethlen informed the council of ministers about the proceed-
ings of the conference up until then. The analysis of this is not attempted here, 
because the Prime Minister’s intention was to inform the executive, not the 
voters. However, Bethlen held a press conference on 26 April. This was neces-
sitated due to the need to compensate for the critiques that had been published 
in the liberal press. What is more, he also wanted to use the Hungarian results 
achieved at the Genoa Conference to serve campaign purposes in the elections. 
The Prime Minister added that the 1st committee of the conference was the 
political committee, though it was not called that. There were financial and 
economic committees, too. The financial committee dealt with questions of 
currency and loans, but it avoided the problem of reparations. According to 
Bethlen, without discussing and decreasing the amount of reparations, Hunga-
ry’s position cannot be improved. However, he called attention to an achieve-
ment: the material of the English experts contained that “the liabilities of certain 
states ought to be balanced in accordance with their ability to pay”. Therefore, the 
Hungarian delegation joined the British proposal. 
In the economic committee the Hungarian delegation pursued two topics: 
the one was “the ratification of the Portorose Agreement, and the other was the 
creation of a system of preference customs in Central Europe”. In order to ne-
gotiate this, the Hungarians advised the committee to establish a subcommittee 
to “discuss the economic relations of the successor states […] among one an-
other”. This also proved that Hungary was interested in broadening the eco-
nomic and trade relations with neighbouring countries. However, this pro-
posal was turned down by the representatives of the Little Entente. What is 
more, they even refused the French proposal which was mostly similar to the 
Hungarian one. According to Bethlen, because the French delegation rejected 
the disarmament proposal of the Russians, the Hungarians thought that it 
would be improper to propose it again. Furthermore, the Prime Minister re-
viewed the activity of the Hungarian delegation with regard to the protection 
of the Hungarian minorities in the successor states. He also gave voice to his 
hope that these proposals would be supported. 
Bethlen reported that the publication of the German-Russian treaty caused 
“great surprise” at the conference. He thought that if “a certain turn to the right 
happens in the current regime” in Soviet Russia, “then Germany may play a major 
role in the reconstruction of Russia”. He also suggested that probably the entente 
powers would take part in it, too. If that happens, then Hungary is going to 
build such a relationship with Soviet Russia. Bethlen called the news that 
“Hungary entered into such a treaty with the Russian delegation as Germany” 
“an entirely delusory figment”. He also added that “the Hungarian delegation 
neither negotiated, nor did it wish to negotiate with the Russians”, but it only 
passively awaited the evolution of the case.2 However, it is known that the 
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latter statement of the Prime Minister was not true, because the Hungarians 
did negotiate with the Soviet Russian delegation. This question, nevertheless, 
cannot be examined in detail here.3 
Bethlen rightfully claimed that the question of paying the reparations was 
played down in the conference. Even so, he hoped that the conference “will 
pass practical resolutions” in the fields of finances, economy, and trade. How-
ever, he also expressed that it cannot be expected that “those problems which 
stand in the way of the country’s financial and economic reorganisation will disap-
pear”. 
The Prime Minister said that they could not reach to “the roots of the reha-
bilitation of the financial situation” because the question of reparations could 
be discussed only superficially. Therefore, he plausibly claimed that “it will be 
proven that until this question is handled seriously, one cannot talk about the 
economic reconstruction of Europe seriously and one cannot achieve results”. 
Thus, the Prime Minister had a realistic image about these questions. 
Bethlen considered it to be a major result of the conference that the winners 
sat at the green table with the representatives of the defeated countries, and 
could freely exchange their ideas about a lot of issues. Within this framework, 
Hungary had the opportunity to enter into a dialogue with the victorious states 
and also with other European states. According to Bethlen, “this showed the 
considerable improvement of the European political atmosphere. Instead of the winners’ 
dictate, mutual understanding will and ought to evolve”. He called this an ad-
vancement, but at the same time emphasised that “all of Hungary’s and other 
countries’ maladies will not be solved at one blow”. In spite of this, Bethlen 
considered the outcomes of the conference a significant advancement in terms 
of the psychological and “political atmosphere”. 
The Prime Minister stated that the conference made it possible for the Hun-
garian delegation to inform the leaders of the European states about the hard-
ships of Hungary. What is more, according to him, these negotiations could 
dispel “a lot of misunderstandings, a number of instances of propaganda 
launched against Hungary and widespread unfavourable surmises about 
Hungary”. With regard to a few issues, the Hungarian delegation could pro-
vide explanation and thus was able to prepare a better understanding of them. 
In Bethlen’s view, the latter was especially relevant in the case of the great 
powers. However, the Hungarian delegation also contacted the leaders of the 
neighbouring countries personally: the Romanian Prime Minister, the Czecho-
slovakian Prime Minister and Foreign Secretary, Eduard Beneš, and the politi-
cal leaders of Austria. 
As a result of these discussions, Bethlen claimed that after the Conference of 
Genoa the Hungarian government would initiate trade negotiations with Ro-
mania, first by making arrangements for signing a compensational and then a 
trade treaty. They also agreed with Beneš that they would continue the negoti-
ations of Marienbad and Prague that had not been finished the year before. On 
 




the one hand, they intended to sign a trade treaty and a traffic agreement; on 
the other hand, they planned to go on with the discussion of minority ques-
tions. Furthermore, they agreed with the Austrian representatives that the ex-
perts would begin negotiations already in Genoa. Then, the remaining issues 
were going to be settled after the conference in Budapest or in Vienna with the 
mediation of the heads of the governments. Bethlen added that he informed 
the representatives of the great powers about the problem of livestock repara-
tions, too, and he “urged the great powers to reconsider it”. Finally, he also men-
tioned that he endeavoured to gain financial support from the successor states 
to provide subsistence for Queen Zita and her children. However, he could not 
disclose more details about the merits of the case. 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister’s answer to the question of a journalist––
Why did we not enter into economic negotiations with Yugoslavia?–– was that 
the Hungarian government had already initiated this earlier, and if we receive 
a positive response, then Hungarian diplomacy would be open to pursue these 
negotiations further. Another journalist posed a question if it had been dis-
cussed during the conference that Hungary would borrow foreign loans. Bethlen 
replied to this inquiry that this had not been considered in Genoa. The confer-
ence did not raise this question; therefore, it is not relevant for the time being.4 
It can be concluded that Bethlen realistically evaluated the results of the 
Genoa Conference that had proceeded until then. What is more, the experienc-
es he had there imbued him with a certain degree of optimism. However, he 
advised the Hungarian people not to fall prey to illusions. It is true that he 
intended to exaggerate the achievements of the Hungarian delegation com-
pared to what they actually were. Thus, it is understandable that liberal news-
papers––the Világ, Az Est, and Az Újság––continued to publish their critical 
remarks on the work of the Hungarian delegation participating in the Genoa 
Conference. Some liberal politicians also criticised the diplomatic skills of the 
Foreign Secretary, Count Miklós Bánffy.5 Therefore, Bethlen regarded it neces-
sary after this press conference, too, to expound the foreign policy lines of the 
Unity Party and the government in his election campaign. 
The first destination of Bethlen’s campaign tour, who had just returned 
from Genoa, was Eger on 30 April. There, he explicated his opinion on foreign 
and internal policies at the meeting of the Heves County section of the Unity 
Party. Among the objectives of the party programme, he mentioned first that 
“we have to secure our national independence in the field of foreign policy as opposed 
to other nations”. He also claimed that we gained our national independence in 
November 1918 by chance, but “we are not willing to sacrifice that any more 
under any circumstances”. Bethlen stated that there had been such new signs 
in European politics as if “they wished to establish a new Danube confederation. We 
cannot participate in this confederation, and we do not endeavour to enter into one”. 
He emphasised that we want “a strong, united, and great Hungary”. However, 
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“we do not want a federal, old monarchy either”, because it would create “such 
relations in public law that would harm our national sovereignty”. Bethlen also 
added to this that a new federation would not be desired as “in a new federation 
Slavic peoples would be in a leading position”. 
Another foreign policy objective of the Unity Party was conceived by the 
Prime Minister as follows: the use of peaceful methods to achieve that “the 
Hungarian nation should possess equality compared to the other nations”. On the 
Wilsonian principles he claimed that Wilson “preached justice, equality, and 
the rule of law among the peoples” in 1918. Yet since then, we have experi-
enced that “there is no truth, no equality, and no rightful law among the Euro-
pean peoples, only the victors and the defeated. (Quite so! Exactly!) All rights are 
assumed by the winners.” 
As a consequence of this, “they interfere with our internal affairs”. In addi-
tion to this, Bethlen said that this “nation was dismantled and disarmed: our 
neighbours, however, can arm themselves without any restraint and threaten 
us”. Therefore, “our foreign policy is set to achieve to gain our equality once 
again […] and […] to disarm our neighbours, (Cheering!), because until it hap-
pens, those who are armed will keep intervening into the politics of the peo-
ples of Central Europe”. Bethlen primarily meant the Little Entente: the King-
dom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. 
Furthermore, Bethlen explained that there was no equality in the field of 
trade policy either. “They interfere with our finances, and what was gained by 
the hard work of the Hungarian people, they wish to take it under the name of 
reparations. We were obliged to sign the peace treaty; this nonetheless cannot mean 
that later generations of the Hungarian nation should wither in eternal servitude (Ac-
clamation.)”.6 
This speech of Bethlen at the elections was feistier than his press conference 
on 26 April. This may have been related to what had ensued in the meantime 
at the Genoa negotiations. His expounding which showed an acknowledge-
ment of foreign policy power relations but originated from national self-esteem 
was received by his audience with acclaim. These ideas of Bethlen are im-
portant also for the reason that they have not been discussed in the relevant 
literature. 
The next campaign tour of the Prime Minister on 7 May targeted Hajdú and 
Bihar Counties. On this trip he was also accompanied by István Nagyatádi 
Szabó, a leading politician of smallholders, and Gyula Gömbös, too. The for-
mer was the president of the Unity Party, while the latter directed the election 
campaign of the party as its executive director. After the programme speeches 
delivered in Kismarja and Derecske, the next destination of the Tiszántúl 
(Transtisza) campaign tour was Debrecen. Here, the meeting of the Unity Party 
was held in the great hall of Hotel Bika at noon. In this speech Bethlen primari-
ly touched upon foreign policy questions. As he pointed out, “all foreign policy 
aims at securing national life by entering into treaties of friendship with the op-
 




ponents of the nation and by other means”. He also added, however, that this 
had preconditions: the nation must have adequate sovereignty and equality on 
par with other nations in order to have a likewise ordered social and state life, 
and its authority must be based on decent economic and cultural forces. Beth-
len considered it important that nothing should happen in the country which 
may hurt our foreign policy. “No effective foreign policy can be pursued as 
long as the contemporary conditions of party politics prevail.” With this state-
ment he implied that the government was able to realise an effective foreign 
policy only if it stood on the supporting pillars of a large and united party. He 
rightfully claimed that the second royal putsch deteriorated the chances of our 
foreign policy, and gave an opportunity for a policy of intervention. He point-
ed out that “this opposition also exists today, this is a wedge in the nation’s 
body, and as long as it stays there, we will barely be able to avoid a policy of 
intervention”. This criticism was addressed to the legitimists, most importantly 
to the policy that characterised the campaign of the Andrássy-Friedrich party. 
Afterwards, Bethlen discussed the accusation of the “Octobrists and their 
allies” – by whom he understood the liberal and democratic opposition – 
namely that the government “does not dare or want to maintain order. Yet the 
exact opposite is the truth.” After the world war and the revolutions, order 
could not be restored in Europe in a relatively short time. “We also have to live 
through some regrettable events, which ought to pass and will evanesce, be-
cause we are keen on phasing them out. (Cheering.) However, this does not 
empower anybody to slander and attack the Hungarian government or to taint 
Hungary’s reputation and to destroy the chances of our foreign policy. (Exact-
ly! Applause.) Under such circumstances it is very hard to achieve any result in 
the field of foreign policy”. 
Then, Bethlen canvassed the foreign policy programme of his government: 
“The aim of our foreign policy can be nothing else but the reconstruction of the sover-
eignty of the Hungarian nation, of the equality of the Hungarian nation with other 
nations and the casting off the yoke of the policy of intervention. (Quite so! Exactly! 
Boisterous acclaim.) But we can achieve this only if we stay in harmony with those 
endeavours which set out to create peace in Europe, with the European trends. We are 
not a nation living on an island, but a part of a great family of peoples, the 
civilisation of which is united, which is based on a united cultural, state, and 
social system. Under these conditions we cannot isolate ourselves. To draw a par-
allel, if we are in international company, we cannot loiter in white gaiters or a 
red tailcoat, neither can we moon about in dresses with a warrior’s knot, but 
we have to behave as the other nations and we have to join them in the en-
deavours that serve the progress of humanity (Quite so! Hear, hear!) Every 
nation has their right to have their own way, but the possibility and right to pre-
vail is only given as long as it is in harmony with the progress of humanity. […] It is 
imperative to act in harmony with the other peoples, because this is our only future.” 
These were the words with which Bethlen ended this important and progres-
sive line of thought. 
BETHLEN’S 1922 CAMPAIGN… 
83 
 
In the rest of his speech Bethlen dealt with the European situation that 
emerged after the peace treaties had been signed: in his view, ever since then, 
there had been victorious and defeated, exploiter and exploited nations. Even 
so, he pacified his audience by pointing out that the victors would enter into 
negotiations with us, too, since “in this point of Europe peace has no value 
without us. […] Because this “mutilated Hungary is a gravitational point of a 
much greater territory and the power of this gravitation cannot be undone by 
any means possible”. 
Furthermore, the Prime Minister emphasised that “even if I warn you to be pa-
tient, it does not mean that I preach the policy of grovelling”. However, he also add-
ed that “when there is a new Europe on the rise, and new peace conditions are 
negotiated, we should not walk around with hand grenades, because we ruin 
all chances of our own policy”. In other words, Bethlen urged to accept the 
given international situation, as he hoped for new peace conditions on the ba-
sis of his experience gained at the Genoa Conference. 
Then Bethlen explained that Hungarian foreign policy had four such direct aims 
which fitted into the new peace policy outlined by the Genoa Conference: “The 
first is the reconstruction of economic equality in the whole spectrum and the rei-
nitiating of economic relations with the neighbouring countries. The second is 
the postponing of the question of reparations. Hungary is unable to pay repara-
tions. (Vivid acclaim.) The third objective is the protection of Hungarian minor-
ities in those territories which had been detached from us. The fourth is the 
cessation of the policy of intervention by our joining to that political orienta-
tion which announced the programme of Europe’s disarmament”. 
Bethlen also talked about these aims one by one. For example, with regard 
to the suspension of the war reparations he said that “without foreign credit and 
loan this nation will not be able to reconstruct either its financial or economic life”. As 
for the Hungarians who became a national minority, he added that “it is our 
obligation and right to bring this question to an international forum, because 
the concerned states obliged themselves in Articles 47 and 54 of the peace trea-
ty to comply with the minority treaty”. 
At the end of his speech, Bethlen once again underlined the need that we 
ought to fit into the greater orientations of European politics. “If we set our 
goals correctly, then indeed, with the new reorganisation of the map of Europe, 
Hungary will find its own place. (Cheering.) However, the precondition of this 
is that our internal policy should not thwart our foreign policy and that those 
oppositions which separate one Hungarian from the other should also come to 
an end”.7 
In his Debrecen Speech the Prime Minister pointed out that the parties of 
the opposition had no foreign policy programmes. On the other hand, he gave 
a realistic foreign policy programme: this fitted into the expectations of the 
winners, but at the same time made a stand for the country’s independence 
and full sovereignty. The programme refused the intervention of the Little 
 




Entente into the internal affairs of Hungary, but urged to enter into trade trea-
ties with them. What is more, it also made a stand for the interests of the Hun-
garians living as a minority. All these considerations show that Bethlen arrived 
at plausible foreign policy conclusions on the basis of the negotiations and 
experience gained at the Genoa Conference. These realistic foreign policy anal-
yses of the situation and objectives already showed that Bethlen supported the 
consolidation of Hungarian foreign policy, too. It was also a contribution to the 
1922 election campaign of the Unity Party, and last but not least, to the devel-
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